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Comment  Frederic S. Mishkin
There are several key features of emerging market economies that make 
them very diﬀerent from advanced economies: they have weak ﬁ  scal, mone-
tary policy, and ﬁ  nancial institutional frameworks that lead to high levels of 
transactions and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies (dollarization) 
and larger credit market imperfections.1 The chapter by Batini, Levine, and 
Pearlman is very nice because, given the special features of emerging market 
economies, it asks exactly the right questions in examining macroeconomic 
policy issues in these economies: (a) How do ﬁ  nancial frictions aﬀect mac-
roeconomic volatility and monetary policy? (b) Because of extensive dol-
larization, should the exchange rate have a special role in monetary policy?
In my discussion of the chapter, I will ﬁ  rst discuss what it does, as well as 
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their model, describe their results, and then ask whether the results are right 
and what policy conclusions should we draw from them.
The Model
The chapter develops a small open economy dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model along the lines of Gertler, Gilchrist, and Nata-
lucci (2007) to examine the eﬀects of volatility and monetary policy from 
(a) transactions dollarization (TD), (b) credit market imperfections (ﬁ  nan-
cial accelerator [FA], and (c) liability dollarization (the denomination of 
debts in foreign currency, often dollars, which they refer to as ﬁ  nancial dol-
larization [FD].2 Their model has several unique features that distinguish it 
from the standard open economy model: (a) money enters the utility func-
tion in a nonseparable way so there is an eﬀect of interest rate on aggregate 
supply; (b) households derive utility from both domestic and foreign (dol-
lar) money holdings; (c) ﬁ  rms have some of their debt in foreign currency 
(liability dollarization); and (d) there is a ﬁ  nancial accelerator because there 
are ﬁ  nancial frictions.
While I applaud the basic framework of their model, I have concerns 
about their approach to modeling transactions dollarization using money 
in the utility function. I have always been skeptical of deriving the demand 
for money and thinking about the monetary transmission mechanism using 
money in the utility function. The results from this approach are very depen-
dent on the exact form of the utility function, about which we know little. 
For example, in their model, utility is nonseparable in all its arguments and 
there are strong assumptions about cross derivatives and second derivatives 
that are not immediately obvious. In addition, putting money in the util-
ity function does not always provide us with good intuition as to what is 
going on. An alternative way to go is transactions- based approaches, which 
might provide clearer intuition on the role of money, and therefore make it 
easier for us to evaluate results. However, embedding a transactions-  based 
approach to the role of money may not be easy to do in their model, and 
transactions-  based approaches can have their own problems if they make 
unattractive assumptions to make them tractable. Nonetheless, their use of 
money in the utility function casts some doubt on particular results, as I 
will discuss later.
The second set of issues with their modeling approach is that their results 
are likely to be highly dependent on the modeling assumptions, especially 
on their choices about the values of calibrated parameters. Let me give four 
examples. First, expenditure-  switching eﬀects from exchange rate changes 
are apparently small in their model, relative to balance sheet eﬀects, because 
2. Batini, Levine, and Pearlman use the nonstandard term “ﬁ  nancial dollarization,” which I 
think is confusing because it could encompass dollarization of transactions while the authors 
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of their calibration choices. Expenditure- switching and balance sheet eﬀects 
work in opposite directions, so this feature of their model has important 
implications. In contrast to their paper, Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004) 
ﬁ  nd that in emerging market economies with small or moderate debt to net 
worth, exchange rate depreciation is actually expansionary in an emerging 
market economy because the stimulus from expenditure-  switching eﬀects 
are greater than the contractionary balance sheet eﬀects. Second, the inﬂ  a-
tion measure used in the Taylor rule is a domestic rather than an aggregate 
measure like the consumer price index (CPI). This is quite nonstandard 
because most Taylor rules use aggregate inﬂ  ation measures. Third, the pass- 
through from exchange rate changes appears to be complete in their model. 
Fourth, the loss function for welfare comparisons is aﬀected by calibration 
choices.
The bottom line is that to really be convinced by the results, we need to 
see them exposed to a robustness analysis for key parameters in the model 
involving habit persistence, trade elasticities, shares of imported goods in 
investment, debt to net worth, and so forth. The authors are aware of this 
and indicate that they do plan to do this in future research.
Results
There are ﬁ  ve major results derived from the model in the chapter. First, 
transactions dollarization is not a big deal. Transactions dollarization has 
little impact on volatility. Indeed, the welfare loss even falls with greater 
transactions dollarization because the supply-  side eﬀect from interest rate 
changes declines, making monetary policy more eﬀective. Second, the ﬁ  nan-
cial accelerator and liability dollarization are a “lethal cocktail for welfare.” 
Third, the simple Taylor rule as a guide to monetary policy is only slightly 
suboptimal. Fourth, ﬁ  xed exchange rate regimes are very bad. Fifth, in a 
ﬂ  exible exchange rate regime, the monetary authorities should not respond 
to the exchange rate in their Taylor rule.
Are Their Conclusions Right?
Let’s look at each of these results in turn. The result that transactions dol-
larization is not very important to how the economy in an emerging market 
country behaves sounds right to me. Even with a diﬀerent model, it is hard 
to think that the form of the transactions medium is a big deal to welfare. On 
the other hand, my skepticism about using money in the utility function as a 
modeling strategy makes me suspicious of the result that more transactions 
dollarization makes the economy better oﬀ. A diﬀerent transactions-  based 
model or diﬀerent assumptions about the utility function might lead to a 
diﬀerent result.
I strongly believe that the result that credit market imperfections and 
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is right on the money. Other theoretical models3 and detailed studies of 
ﬁ  nancial crises in emerging market countries that I have described in my 
recent book (Mishkin 2006) strongly supports this conclusion. The lethal 
cocktail leads to two important policy conclusions that I stress in my book. 
First, it is imperative that emerging market countries promote reforms to 
improve their institutional framework—legal system, disclosure of informa-
tion, and prudential supervision of the ﬁ  nancial system. Not only are these 
reforms crucial to economic growth, but they also reduce lower credit market 
imperfections and make the economy more ﬁ  nancially robust; that is, less 
susceptible to ﬁ  nancial crises.
Second, emerging market countries need to take steps to limit currency 
mismatch (debts denominated in foreign currency when the value of pro-
duction is denominated in domestic currency). One way of doing this is 
through prudential regulation and supervision, which can be used to restrict 
ﬁ  nancial institutions from lending in foreign currency to ﬁ  rms whose output 
is denominated in domestic currency. In their model, they do not allow for 
indexation of debt. Reducing currency mismatch can also be promoted by 
encouraging debt that is indexed to inﬂ  ation, as was done in Chile, which 
then decreases the incentives for denominating debt in foreign currency 
(liability dollarization). Good monetary policy that results in both low and 
stable inﬂ  ation also can help discourage liability dollarization.
I also strongly agree with the conclusion that ﬁ  xed exchange rate regimes 
are usually a bad idea for emerging market economies. Financial crises are 
far more likely in emerging market countries that have ﬁ  xed exchange rates 
for the reasons outlined in their model. Fixed exchange rate regimes are 
subject to speculative attacks and if these attacks are successful, the col-
lapse of the domestic currency is usually much larger, more rapid, and more 
unanticipated than when a depreciation occurs under a ﬂ  oating exchange 
rate regime. Then, as the mechanisms in the model in this chapter illustrate, 
ﬁ  xed exchange rate regimes make an emerging market economy especially 
vulnerable to the twin crises of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), in which the 
currency collapses, destroys ﬁ  rms’ and households’ balance sheets, and then 
provokes a ﬁ  nancial crisis and a sharp economic contraction. Supporting 
this view is the fact that countries exiting from pegged exchange rate regimes 
are more prone to higher cost ﬁ  nancial crises and large declines in output 
the longer the exchange rate peg has been in place.4
However, there are additional reasons why ﬁ  xed exchange rate regimes 
are likely to lead to more ﬁ  nancially fragile economies in emerging market 
countries that the chapter does not explore. In their model, the level of liabil-
ity dollarization is exogenous and so they do not allow for another channel 
3. For example, Calvo and Mendoza (2000); Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2000, 2001); 
Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004); Eichengreen and Hausmann (2004); Schneider and Tor-
nell (2004); and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2005).
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that causes ﬁ  xed exchange rate regimes to lower welfare. Fixed exchange 
rate regimes are likely to encourage liability dollarization.5 Then as Batini, 
Levine, and Pearlman indicate, greater liability dollarization leads to greater 
macroeconomic volatility and much lower welfare.
Furthermore, by providing a more stable value of the currency, an 
exchange rate peg can lower the perceived risk for foreign investors and thus 
encourage capital inﬂ  ows. Although these capital inﬂ  ows might be chan-
neled into productive investments and stimulate growth, the presence of a 
government safety net and weak bank supervision can lead instead to exces-
sive lending. An outcome of the capital inﬂ  ow is then likely to be a lending 
boom, an explosion of nonperforming loans and an eventual ﬁ  nancial crisis 
as is described in the case studies in my recent book (Mishkin 2006).
A ﬁ  xed exchange rate regime also can also make it easier for countries to 
tap foreign markets for credit and so make it easier for the government to 
engage in irresponsible ﬁ  scal policy because it is easier for it to sell its debt. 
Argentina provides a graphic example of this problem (Mussa 2002). When 
its ﬁ  scal policy became unsustainable, it provoked a disastrous crisis that 
pushed it into a great depression.
Given the experience with ﬁ  xed exchange rate regimes, Stanley Fischer—
who was the ﬁ  rst deputy managing director of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)—has stated that, “The adoption of ﬂ  exible exchange rate 
systems by most emerging market countries is by far the most important 
emerging market crisis prevention measure.” (Fischer 2003, 19). A ﬂ  exible 
exchange rate regime has the advantage that movements in the exchange rate 
are much less nonlinear than in a pegged exchange rate regime. Indeed, the 
daily ﬂ  uctuations in the exchange rate in a ﬂ  exible exchange rate regime have 
the advantage of making clear to private ﬁ  rms, banks, and governments that 
there is substantial risk involved in issuing liabilities denominated in foreign 
currencies. Furthermore, a depreciation of the exchange rate may provide 
an early warning signal to policymakers that their policies may have to be 
adjusted to limit the potential for a ﬁ  nancial crisis.6
The ﬁ  nding in the chapter that the Taylor rule for monetary policy should 
not respond to the exchange rate leads the authors to make the following 
remarkable claim: “Emerging market central banks should not diﬀerentiate 
the way they set monetary conditions from the way they are set in advanced, 
frictionless economies.” Given the fact that exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations have 
a major impact on ﬁ  rms’ balance sheets in emerging market economies 
because there is liability dollarization, this claim is counterintuitive. Are 
they right?
One caveat for their claim is that the result that the Taylor rule should not 
have a term involving the exchange rate may not withstand robustness tests 
5. See Levy-  Yeyati (2003) and Broda and Levy-  Yeyati (2006).
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using diﬀerent calibrations of their model. There is, however, a stronger 
reason to doubt their conclusion: the economy may be very nonlinear.
In “tranquil” times, their conclusion may well be right because in this 
environment, the economy may be reasonably characterized as linear and 
so their linear quadratic (LQ) approach, which depends on linearity, will 
provide the right intuition. Not responding to the exchange rate in this envi-
ronment also makes a lot of sense because, as is emphasized in Mishkin and 
Savastano (2001), a focus on the exchange rate may lead to a weakening of 
the inﬂ  ation target as a nominal anchor.7
The conclusion that the exchange rate should not have a special role in 
the conduct of monetary policy in emerging market countries, however, is 
likely to be very wrong in a nonlinear world with sudden stops (Calvo 2006), 
which Batini, Levine, and Pearlman do not model at all. In a sudden stop 
episode when capital abruptly stops ﬂ  owing into the country, the normal 
interest rate Taylor rule, which Calvo (2006) calls “interest rate tweaking” 
may not work. Interest rate manipulation may not have the usual eﬀect on 
the exchange rate in these kinds of episodes, with the result that the value 
of the currency would collapse in a nonlinear way, leading to huge negative 
balance sheet eﬀects that cause a ﬁ  nancial crisis and an economic collapse. 
In situations like this, it might make sense to temporarily suspend the inter-
est rate rule and conduct foreign exchange rate interventions to prop up the 
exchange rate.
The bottom line is that benign neglect of the exchange rate could be bad 
policy when a country faces a sudden stop, but in normal, more tranquil 
times, I am sympathetic to their view that the monetary authorities in emerg-
ing market countries should not focus too much on the exchange rate.
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